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Immigration is one of the key issues of contestation in contemporary European 
politics (Boswell, 2003). The populist radical right has more or less successfully 
mobilised around it, some parts of the media are similarly obsessed with it, and many 
voters feel just as strongly. Yet the extent to which immigration plays a part in 
electoral competition in individual states varies considerably, especially when it 
comes to the use made of the issue by parties generally considered mainstream rather 
than extreme. In some countries, the centre-right and the centre-left have made 
immigration central to their electoral campaigns. In others, the issue registers on their 
electoral radar screen, only to virtually disappear in subsequent elections (see e.g. 
Green-Pedersen and Krogstrup, 2008; Pellikann et al, 2007; Cornelius et al, 1994; 
Thränhardt, 1995).  
This variance constitutes a puzzle for the study of electoral politics. Studies 
that try to explain it sometimes start with the supply side, namely the electoral 
significance of anti-immigration parties (see e.g. Kitschelt and McGann, 1995; Betz, 
1994, Mudde, 2004).  The mainstream, the argument runs, leaves a vacuum for the 
radical right to fill. Immigration becomes an ‘issue’ as anti-immigration parties are 
able to capitalise on the voters whose concerns about immigration are supposedly 
ignored by the parties they traditionally support, leaving them with no alternative but 
the extremist or radical option.  In order to remedy this electoral ‘theft’, mainstream 
parties react by sharpening their own stances, breaking taboos, and doing deals, either 
to exclude the radical right from government or to give it a share of the spoils of 
office, either as a full-blown coalition partner or as some kind of support party.  But 
although this may be true in some countries it cannot of course explain why 
immigration is picked up, and picked over, in countries where the electoral and/or 
parliamentary presence of the radical right is, if not absent, then far too small to 
present a serious threat.   
Conversely, a focus on the demand side - on voters - faces problems too. 
Simply knowing what the electorate thinks about immigration does not allow us to 
fully account for either the positions that parties adopt or for when the issue is (or is 
not) emphasised by parties during electoral campaigns. Whatever spatial theory 
(Downs, 1957) suggests, party positions on immigration are often uncoordinated with 
the electorate’s views, not least because there is no guarantee of congruence between 
elite and public priorities and because, owing perhaps to ‘issue diversity’ (Hobolt et 
al, 2008) and ‘agenda friction’ (Schattschneider, 1960), parties can be slow in 
responding to voter preferences – especially when the electoral situation they face 
does not appear to be unduly critical (Adams et al, 2004; Budge, 1994). In any case, 
in an era of valence (as opposed to position) politics, voters' ideological preferences 
may matter less than their judgements about the ability of parties to deliver 
competently (see e.g. Stokes, 1963; Riker, 1996; Green, 2007). In the immigration 
context, it may mean their ability to limit the numbers coming into the country – 
something that may not be wholly within the control of even the most resolutely 
restrictionist government.  
The immigration ‘issue’ is of course ideologically loaded, but it can 
nonetheless be understood as a valance question since mainstream parties, with some 
exceptions, now seem to agree on the direction that policy should take, namely to 
achieve both control and cultural and economic integration.  That said, a party that 
‘owns’ (van der Brug, 2004; Petrocik, 1996) immigration is thus likely to emphasise 
the issue whereas a party that does not and/or performs relatively worse will 
downplay or ignore it. Green and Hobolt (2008) identify a link between issue 
ownership and how parties strive to raise the salience level of that particular issue. 
However, these efforts primarily tend to pay off when they also coincide with voters’ 
own perceptions of the importance of the issue, which are never simply a function of 
party mobilisation (Belanger and Meguid, 2008).  This raises the possibility of a 
mismatch between party approaches and the electorate’s responses or priorities. Why, 
then, do parties get this calculation ‘wrong’?   
For one thing, political parties operate within a space that has at least two-
dimensional dimensions (Kriesi et al, 2006; Kitschelt and McGann, 1995). On the 
one hand, there is a Left-Right axis referring to the appropriate level of state 
involvement in the economy. As such, parties are classified along a spectrum ranging 
from ‘socialist’ to ‘neo-liberal’ (Evans at al, 1996; Kriesi et al, 2006). This ‘old’ 
politics dimension concerned, among other issues, labour market regulation, 
public/private ownership and level of taxation, and characterised a majority of the 
West European democracies from the mid-20th century to the early 1970s. Divisions 
between parties were often sharp with voter preferences mapping onto social class. 
From the 1970s onwards, however, conflict regarding the state’s involvement in the 
economy became less polarised and contestation, when present, tended to revolve 
around, say, the scope of publicly provided welfare or the speed of privatisation 
(Inglehart, 1997). However, a ‘new’ source of conflict emerged which related to 
‘post-material’, or what Hooghe et al (2002) have labelled GAL/TAN, issues such as 
environmental protection, nationalism, personal freedoms, and questions of ethnicity 
and culture.  
As Hooghe et al. also note, attitudes towards further EU integration constitute 
a particularly difficult issue for parties to assimilate into either an economic or a 
socio-cultural (GAL/TAN) Left-Right dimension. Immigration gives rise to a similar 
dilemma since it cuts across several, sometimes disparate, policy fields. It not only 
has economic effects, whether ‘positive’ (e.g. meeting supply shortages or keeping 
wage inflation low) or ‘negative’ (e.g. sparking labour market chauvinism, creating a 
new, ‘ethnic’ underclass or removing the incentives for firms and governments to 
train and educate the native-born working class), but immigration also impacts on 
notions of national identity, social cohesion, language, welfare provision, law and 
order, terrorism and security, and cultural practices. This puts the political mainstream 
in a precarious situation since these effects tap into prevailing ideological tensions 
that exist within, and between, parties. The shift from uni- to multi-dimensional 
contestation not only adds further complexity to party classification (Benoit and 
Laver, 2007; Klingemann et al, 2006), but, rather more importantly, also means that 
these tensions can crystallise thus subjecting parties to a set of conflicting ideological 
‘pulls’ on a whole series of issues.  Most obviously, the right’s traditional emphasis on 
‘less state’ in the economy is counterpointed by a pull towards ‘more state’ influence 
on individual lifestyle choices and the preservation of national identity, while the 
left’s traditional concern to limit the role of the market, through extensive state action, 
provides a contrast with ideas of localised democracy, international solidarity and 
increased personal freedom that arguably call for less state influence. The 
introduction of a new, and increasingly non-economic, cleavage allowed new parties 
to form and be (occasionally) successful – in particular Green parties - and, as such, 
these ideological tensions have often been neutralised (Jahn, 1993; Müller-Rommel, 
1989).   
However, competing on the immigration ‘issue’ can make these strains 
(re)emerge causing framing, positioning and campaigning dilemmas for the political 
mainstream. For the centre-right, it crystallises a tension between market liberal and 
culturally conservative wings. The former, predominantly present in Liberal 
Democratic and Conservative parties, often pushes for immigration policies to be 
liberalised and for the private sector to have greater powers in deciding the 
appropriate levels of, especially, labour migration. The latter, often present in 
Christian Democratic and Conservative parties, will be hesitant about handing over 
such a key area of sovereignty to non-state actors, fearing the loss of control of 
national borders and culture. Both wings also tend to experience conflicting attitudes 
towards asylum and family reunification migration. Since the former category is 
usually legally prevented from economic participation, and the latter’s entry into the 
labour market can be delayed due to linguistic, cultural and/or educational reasons, it 
will make the benefits of these types of migrants less obvious which in turn will  
make it difficult for market liberals to justify why policies should be liberalised. 
While asylum migration, and subsequent family reunification, may also bring 
individuals who emphasise the family unit and traditional lifestyles, their perceptions 
of the ‘family’ and ‘traditional lifestyles’ may run contrary to what the culturally 
conservative wing has in mind. Further problems may arise if these ‘new’ values and 
lifestyles clash with particular ‘Western’ values that stress e.g. equality, especially 
between the sexes, or emancipation.   
The centre-left struggles with a similar dilemma. For Social Democratic and 
reformed Left parties, limiting immigration can easily be seen as vital in order to 
retain collective power and good terms and conditions in the labour market. Giving 
up the right to decide on entry would run the risk of undermining the collectively 
bargained agreements and allow wages to be undercut. And in the long run, 
‘uncontrolled’ immigration could potentially create not new recruits to the cause 
(Ireland, 2004; Breunig and Luedtke, 2008, see also Messina, 2007) but rather a new 
– ethnic - underclass and accordingly, split the indigenous working class (Givens and 
Luedtke, 2004). At the same time, the centre-left has been influenced by ‘new’ post-
material ideas. Green and reformed Left parties often view immigration as a 
fundamental human right and taking on workers and, especially, refugees would thus 
be an important aspect of showing one’s credentials of international solidarity (Jahn, 
1993; Müller-Rommel, 1989).  
These tensions will have an affect on party behaviour and competition. 
Adopting either a ‘leftist’ (international solidarity/free market) or a ‘rightist’ (labour 
market protectionist/value-conservative) position is associated with particular risks 
and emphasising either position will have important electoral and organisational 
implications. If parties get the emphasis wrong, it may alienate their natural voters 
and jeopardise governing potential. As such, the immigration ‘issue’ can cause 
ideological splits and intra-party fragmentation, which further hinders the chances of 
(re)winning elections. Little wonder, then, that it often makes strategic sense to 
downplay or ignore immigration as an electoral priority. Yet parties have to be 
sensitive to shifts in public opinion and if immigration moves up the agenda, they 
must respond to voters’ concerns. On the other hand, emphasising the issue too much 
gives the populist radical right unwanted attention and may further destabilise the 
political arena. Parties must therefore perform a difficult balancing act. They must 
engage with the immigration ‘issue’ in a way that avoids highlighting these tensions, 
thereby shifting the electoral focus away from parties’ key areas of policy strength 
and electoral priorities. At the same time, they have somehow to improve their 
capacity to handle a matter of acute public concern while not opening themselves up 
to criticism, which, in turn, gives the populist radical right unwarranted attention.  
In the light of all this, we ask the contributors to this special issue to address 
when, why, and how do mainstream parties decide whether or not to emphasise 
immigration during their election campaigns?  We have also asked them to adopt the 
same analytical lens in order to not get ‘trapped in context’ (Bale et al, 2010: 412). Of 
particular concern has been to evaluate the explanatory potential of two competing 
frameworks. On the one hand, a more structurally orientated approach which 
addresses the extent to which parties react to a set of immigration ‘shocks’, and then 
assesses the importance of these for the type of party responses, (re)positioning and 
pursued electoral strategies (Norris, 1995; van Spanje, 2010; Mudde, 2004, see also 
Rabinowitz and MacDonald, 1989; Kitschelt and McGann, 1995; Betz, 1994). These 
shocks are not just limited to the emergence, and subsequent electoral success, of the 
populist radical right but are also contingent upon an additional set of indigenous and 
exogenous factors. These include, but are not limited to, increased immigration and 
asylum pressures; the perceived economic and/or cultural ‘cost’ of 
immigration/integration and changing levels of media and public attention paid to the 
immigration ‘issue’. None of these factors exist independently of each other and more 
often than not they will create a feedback loop in the political discourse. But 
immigration will impact on countries in different ways and responses have 
subsequently tended to vary. Parties therefore tend to behave selectively and 
emphasise particular aspect(s) of the immigration ‘issue’ in their campaigns. 
Additionally, certain events, such as increased terrorist activities or threats, often 
manage to cut across the immigration/integration divide. It would thus seem 
reasonable to assume that the above factors lead parties to respond by sharpening 
their stances on the immigration ‘issue’. That is, one might anticipate finding a degree 
of fit between immigration developing in a ‘negative’ direction and parties taking up 
more restrictive positions and discourses.  
 However, this assumes that there is a stimulus-response relationship between 
immigration ‘shocks’ and restrictive repositioning – one that does not attribute parties 
much agency or agenda-setting power. Furthermore, if parties’ responses to the presence 
of populist radical right challengers or various immigration and integration pressures 
really are so automatic, it is difficult to explain when, and why, immigration does not 
motivate parties to campaign on, or emphasise, a restrictive agenda.   
The special issue, then, will also consider how much agency parties exercise 
and how much leeway they actually have or give themselves (van der Brug, 2004; 
Petrocik, 1996). While migratory pressures and populist radical right challenges are 
obviously still relevant in explaining party actions, we also consider parties’ ability to 
handle the conflicting ideological strains described above. Since immigration has 
been described as being an important contributor to the transformation of established 
cleavages (Kriesi et al, 2006; 2008) as well as an issue associated with the demise of 
ideology (Lahav, 1997), parties are likely to find it difficult to come up with a new 
‘master frame’ (Rydgren, 2005) around the issue while simultaneously experiencing 
intra-organisational strains due to competing factions and issue orientations. Parties 
are therefore expected to try to divert attention to issues which they are particularly 
trusted on if they cannot successfully negotiate, and manage, these opposing ‘pulls’. 
This focus will thus allow us to examine and explain instances where parties do not 
behave as expected. 
Based on these conditions and what the literature suggests party behaviour to 
be like, the special issue proposes the following three hypotheses:  
 
H1: Parties will emphasise their ability to deal with the immigration ‘issue’ if there is 
significant inter-party agreement over the direction of immigration/integration 
policies.  If not, not.  
 
H2: Parties will downplay/ignore the immigration ‘issue’ if voters’ trust in them on 
the issue is lower than it is for the other party. 
 
H3: Parties will divert attention toward areas of greater competence if they are unable 
to resolve any ideological tensions stemming from the immigration ‘issue’. 
 
 Case selection 
 
The cases included in this special issue are in some respects ‘the usual suspects’ when 
it comes to studying the politics of immigration in Western Europe (Belgium; 
Germany; the Netherlands and Sweden) but we have also included cases that are 
covered less frequently (Italy, Greece and Spain). The above countries do not only 
have a sizable migrant and/or ethnic minority population but they have also, with 
some exception for the latter three countries, received substantial attention in the 
literature (see e.g. Boswell, 2006; Castles and Miller. 2003; Hammar, 2006; Messina, 
2007). The cases are of further interest since they also offer a high degree of variation 
in terms of the sources of newcomers; approaches to integration and the degree of 
contestation that the immigration ‘issue’ endures during elections.  
Belgium and the Netherlands form a ‘post-colonial’ cluster which is 
juxtaposed by Sweden, Germany, Greece, Italy and Spain who, conversely, have had 
higher numbers of asylum seekers and, especially for the latter three, undocumented 
migrants. Similarly, the countries differ in terms of their ‘conceptions of citizenship’ 
(Koopmans and Statham, 2000) and display varying degrees of ‘civic republicanism’ 
and ‘ethnic segregationist’-traits in their approaches to migrant integration. Finally, 
the way that the immigration ‘issue’ has figured on parties’ electoral radar screens 
shows ample variation but also some crucial similarities. While the Dutch parties 
have come to adopt an increasingly confrontational approach, immigration has rarely 
been a source of contestation in Sweden, even though both countries share similar 
institutional surroundings and approaches to integration. On the other hand, Germany 
and Sweden display some surprising similarities in the way that the immigration 
‘issue’ has played out in electoral politics even though these cases have very different 
institutional conditions and ways of dealing with immigration and integration. Some 
of the cases have also experienced the sudden rise of populist radical right challengers 
but this rise has come with quite different mainstream party responses. Although 
some of the Swedish parties have hinted at a more restrictive line on immigration, 
they have not abandoned key stances on asylum, anti-discrimination and cultural 
differences which, in contrast, have been crucial developments in the Netherlands. In 
addition, the Swedish parties have showed few signs of trying to accommodate the 
populist radical right or to incorporate their position. 
Italy and Belgium are in comparison the odd cases out. In the former, there are 
difficulties involved in identifying ‘the mainstream’, especially so if the mainstream 
parties are defined according to ideological distance and electoral success. Such a 
definition would place the populist radical right very much at the heart of the Italian 
centre-right family thus blurring the distinction between ‘mainstream’ and 
‘radical’/‘extremist’ parties. In the latter, Belgium provides an anomaly in terms of 
immigration’s level of contestation. While a majority of the countries covered in this 
issue exhibit some degree of polarisation between parties that want to pursue a more 
liberal vs. a more restrictive approach, the Belgian parties have tended to find 
consensus around a ‘doctrine of zero-immigration’ (Martiniello, 2003:225) where the 
main emphasis has been to reduce, prevent and reverse migration flows as much as 
possible. Greece, on the other hand, provides an extreme example of the state of ‘flux’ 
(Mair, 1989) that West European party systems are in politically as well 
economically. 
In order to test the relevance of the special issue’s thesis regarding ‘conflicting 
ideological pulls’, the case selection includes countries with varying degrees of 
opposition to immigration, ranging from Greece (strongest) to Belgium; Germany; 
the Netherlands; Italy; Spain and Sweden (lowest) (Sides and Citrin, 2007). We have 
also included countries where the populist radical right has a parliamentary presence 
(Belgium, Greece, the Netherlands, Sweden, and Italy) and where it does not 
(Germany and Spain). The countries will thus shed light on the extent to which 
immigration, as a party-politically relevant issue, is dependent, or largely 
independent, of these externalities. While we anticipate that the above conditions will 
have some effect on immigration’s level of politicisation, our main emphasis is placed 
on parties’ abilities to handle and negotiate these ideological ‘pulls’ and issue 
priorities. As such, we argue that it is the dynamics of party competition that is the 
key explanatory factor for when and why immigration becomes an electoral issue. 
Finally, we have asked the contributors to focus on both the centre-right and the 
centre-left. While previous work tends to focus on how anti-immigration parties in 
Europe seek to influence policy-making, there is an increasing body of literature that 
acknowledges the role played by the political mainstream (see e.g. Perlmutter, 1996; 
Meguid, 2005; van der Brug and van Spanje, 2009). This literature also points to how 
the immigration ‘issue’ has often been associated with the centre-left and, especially, 
with Social Democratic and (reformed) Left Parties, predominantly due to the 
dominance of this party family in the post-war period and but also because of the 
particular patterns of immigration that Western Europe experienced from 1945 to 
1973 and from 1973 onwards. In a majority of the countries covered in this special 
issue, centre-left constellations have had a persistent presence and were therefore able 
to shape immigration and integration policies for a number of years. Since labour 
migration constituted the main source of newcomers up to mid-1970s, this ‘new’ 
working class tended to gravitate leftwards (Ireland, 2004). The link between 
‘immigrants’ and ‘the Left’ stems from how the former were considered to be part of 
the Left’s core constituencies and where the latter’s emphasis on ‘equality’ meant that 
immigrants became a key societal group to focus on (Breunig and Luedtke, 2008; see 
also Messina, 2007). In contrast, the centre-right has had a much more difficult time 
positioning themselves on the immigration ‘issue’ since there has not always been an 
obvious ideological lynchpin to hang their position on. Consequently, when 
immigration patterns shifted towards asylum and family reunification, the centre-left 
continued to claim these groups as ‘theirs’. The centre-right struggled to come up 
with a suitable strategy since their inclination towards immigration – tightening 
border controls and limiting access to citizenship – often coincided with the position 
that parties further to the right adopted. Therefore, the centre-left has often been 
central for studies focussing on immigration and integration policies (Bale, 2008) 
with the implied suggestion that immigration preferences could be read along a Left 
(Pro) – Right (Anti) continuum. This selective tendency is notable since one can 
observe a, perhaps surprising, degree of continuity in the immigration policies 
pursued across Western Europe. Whether immigration policies became more 
restrictive, or integration policies more demanding, does not always map onto parties’ 
ideological affiliation. That is, the centre-left is just as likely as the centre-right to 
introduce changes regarding immigration controls, citizenship policies or access to 
welfare benefits (Dummett, 2005; Hinnfors et al, 2011).   
Finally, when analysing their respective cases, we ask the contributors to address the 
following questions.  
1) How divided are parties over the direction of immigration and/or integration 
policies?  
2) Are some parties more trusted than others on the immigration ‘issue’? If so, 
how have these differences played out in party competition? 
3) Has ‘the immigration issue’ brought the ideological tensions to the fore?  If so, 
how have the mainstream parties handled these strains? 
 
 
 
 
For the German parties agreeing on direction has been accompanied by an increased 
emphasis on competence yet this has often been reluctantly, rather than 
enthusiastically, pursued. As Schmidtke’s contribution suggests, this hesitation is 
linked to a two-fold challenge of how further ownership competition may result in an 
unwelcome opening for the populist radical right, as well as how the centre-left and 
centre-right struggled with agreeing on what type of issue the immigration ‘issue’ 
constituted. But equally, the intra-party struggles facing, particularly parts of centre-
left, has meant an additional level of complexity when deciding on which segment of 
voters to pursue – the ‘new’ ethnic or the ‘old’ working-class vote? The centre-right 
has fared comparatively better when merging the immigration ‘issue’ with policy 
areas associated with high levels of public trust.   
 The conflicting ideological ‘pulls’ have also been present in the Swedish case.  
But as Widfeldt points out however these tensions have rarely translated into any 
overt electoral conflict but have instead remained under the surface. The centre-left 
has been more prone to such strains given the clear tension on labour and asylum 
migration between the ‘old’ and ‘new’ left parties, whereas the centre-right has 
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managed to steer the political conversation towards the former category thereby 
avoiding any potential disunity arising from the latter. 
 In the Netherlands, and to a lesser extent in Flanders as well, all bets appear to 
be off. Regardless of whether issue positions converge or diverge, or the extent of 
‘pull’ that parties experience, Super notes that the mainstream has increasingly opted 
for an ownership approach. Yet this has also been coupled with a more cautious 
‘Goldilocks’ tactic that attempts to straddle the ‘liberal’/’restrictionist’-divide without 
drawing too much attention to the party’s position.  
The Mediterranean cases provide an illuminating contrast but also a number of 
similarities to the above examples. Karamanidou’s article, for example, highlights 
how ideological strains, and the overall directional consensus, have indeed come to 
affect the tactics of the Greek mainstream and how these factors, quite clearly, have 
pushed parties towards an ownership-style mode of competition. At the same time, 
however, the sudden (and arguably successful) rise of Golden Dawn has accentuated 
these strives rather than prompted parties to respond with a dismissive approach or to 
divert attention elsewhere. And despite converging around largely restrictive 
positions, Morales and her co-writers find that this has not necessarily translated into 
a higher frequency of ownership claims among the Spanish mainstream. Rather 
counterintuitively in fact, the attention paid to, and the degrees of ownership 
competition over, the immigration ‘issue’ appear to be out of synch since even the 
parties that exhibit relatively lower levels of trust emphasise it as much as parties that 
have higher levels of trust. The Spanish case also suggests a greater role for ideology 
in the political discourse around immigration but any similar strains to those 
identified in the other case countries appear, by and large, absent. Parties instead tend 
to stick to their long standing positions despite political conditions suggesting greater 
levels of positional; tactical and saliency shifts. This is possibly because of the 
novelty that the immigration ‘issue’ presents and how the Spanish parties have yet to 
agree on an appropriate frame and problem formulation of the ‘issue’. This leaves the 
rather paradoxical case of Italy. Massetti finds that the intra-party and inter-coalition 
dynamics have effectively trumped any hesitation that the more mainstream centre-
right parties have experienced when dealing with radical coalition partners such as the 
Lega Nord. When the centre-left usually struggles to accommodate labour market 
protectionism with a focus on international solidarity, the Italian equivalent has been 
remarkably unaffected by this particular ‘pull’ due to the two-tier structure of the 
labour market. This situation has thus come to neutralise any destabilising tension 
between different party wings and factions.  
Where does this leave party competition on one of the most ideologically 
ambiguous policy areas in Western Europe? For starters, the overall picture suggests 
parties to be cautious creatures that will take the safer ownership route rather than to 
pursue the more perilous choice option. A reasonable explanation for this behaviour 
would be that the choice on offer may very well border that of the mainstream’s more 
radical competitors. And should the former thus miscalculate and get the balance 
‘wrong’, they might find themselves in a particularly unpleasant ideological bear-trap 
which may be very difficult to get out of (Bale, 2010).  
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